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TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS AND
THE PRESENT REAL PROPERTY TAX
SYSTEM IN NEW YORK CITY
Mark A. Willis*
I. Introduction
New York state law requires that all real property be assessed at
full market value and within a single jurisdiction taxed at the same
statutory rate.1 Tax liability is determined using a property's as-
sessed value. Therefore, under a uniform tax system such as the
one required by state law, all real property is subject to the same
effective tax rate, that is, the same taxes per dollar of market
value.
Current practices in the City of New York contrast sharply with
the requirement of a uniform tax system.2 Properties in the city
are assessed at differing percentages of market value. These assess-
* Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. B.A. 1968, Yale University. J.D.
1971, Harvard Law School. Ph.D. (Economics) 1979, Yale University. The author has served
as a consultant to the City of New York on property tax and economic development
problems. Parts of this article are reprinted with permission from the Summer, 1980 issue of
the Quarterly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The views expressed in
this article are those of the author and not of his employer.
1. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 306 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See Hellerstein v.
Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 279, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1975), modified, 39
N.Y.2d 920, 352 N.E.2d 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1976). See generally Beebe & Sinnot, In the
Wake of Hellerstein: Whither New York?, 43 ALB. L. REv. 203 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
In the Wake of Hellerstein]; Lesnick, Does Full Value Mean Full Value? Prospects for
Assessment Reform in New York in Light of the Experiences of Other States with Heller-
stein's Progenitors, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 235 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Prospects for Full
Value] Note, Hellerstein v. Assessor of the Town of Islip: A Response to Inequities in Real
Property Assessments in New York, 27 SRA cusE L. REV. 1045 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
A Response to Inequities]. Full value in New York is defined in terms of market value. If
market value cannot be established, New York courts rely on other tests to determine full
value. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 42 N.Y.2d 236, 239-40, 366 N.E.2d 808,
810, 397 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (1977); People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v. Miller, 287 N.Y.
126, 38 N.E.2d 465 (1941).
2. In New York City, "under the current tax system effective tax rates are so widely
disparate, depending on property class or type (residential, commercial, etc.) and borough of
location, that full-value assessment with a uniform tax rate for all classes and boroughs
could create chaos in the city's property tax system." Boast & Vitullo-Martin, The Future
of the Property Tax, THE FIScAL OBSERVER 18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Future of the
Property Tax].
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ment variations produce wide differences in effective tax rates,
particularly between residential and nonresidential properties. For
example, the property taxes paid by owners of single-family houses
in the city are subject to a real property tax rate which is less than
one half of what they would be if the property tax were levied on
the basis of market value. On the other hand, owners of office
buildings tend to pay a relatively large share of taxes. The author,
using data supplied by the New York City Department of Finance,
found that owners of office buildings pay over sixty percent more
than they would if the tax burden were distributed according to
actual property values.8 Because of these and other disparities in
3.
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES FOR SELECTED BUILDING TYPES RELATIVE TO CITYWIDE AVERAGE
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Source: Estimates computed by the author from data furnished by the New York City Department of Finance.
The conclusions reached in this Article are based on an examination of New York City's
property sales from July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1978. After making adjustments to the data
recorded by the city to allow for only transactions that appeared indicative of "true" market
prices, there were close to 26,000 sales. The procedure used, and the shortcomings of the
resulting data, are discussed in technical appendices to the report filed by the author with
the city's Business Tax Task Force and the Department of Finance. Although there seems
little reason to doubt the overall findings of the study regarding dispersion in effective tax
rates, data limitations suggest that caution should be exercised in relying on any particular
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the effective tax rates, a switch by the city to a uniform tax system
would result in major reallocation of the tax burden among the
different property groups in the city. The size of these tax shifts
underscores the potential for economic disruptions from the man-
date of full market value assessment.'
The variations in tax rates is exemplified by the treatment of
property in Manhattan. In that borough, single-family houses are
assessed, on the average, at a much higher percentage of market
value than houses in other boroughs. In fact, Manhattan is the
most heavily taxed borough in the city. Consequently, a conversion
to a uniform tax system would reduce the share of taxes paid by
number as precise.
4. The tax shifts discussed in this Article are based on the assumption that tax shifts are
not capitalized into the value of the property. If, however, these shifts are included in the
capital value of a particular piece of property, the tax shifts will be less pronounced. See H.
AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX? 94 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WHO PAYS THE PROP-
ERTY TAX].
5. Future of the Property Tax, supra note 2, at 18. The fact that assessment ratios for
each type of property vary from borough to borough means that the effects of full valuation
with a uniform tax rate also vary. Residential tax bills will rise approximately 138% in
Queens, 107% in Staten Island, 104% in Brooklyn, 72% in the Bronx, but only 6% in Man-
hattan. Conversely, commercial property tax rates will drop 37% in the Bronx, 31% in
Manhattan, 23% in Brooklyn and Queens, but will rise 22% on Staten Island. Under full
valuation industrial property taxes will drop 39% in Brooklyn, 35% in Manhattan, 34% in
the Bronx, 11% in Queens and 9% in Staten Island.
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owners of Manhattan properties by approximately thirty percent.'
5. EFFECTIVE PROPERTY TAX RATE BY BOROUGH: ALLOWING FOR
DIFFERENCES IN PROPERTY MIX
50% Above
Citywide
Average
50% Below
Manhattan Bronx Brooklyn Queens Staten Island
Source: Estimates derived by author from data furnished by the New York City Department
of Finance.
6. Estimate derived by author from data furnished by the New York City Department of
Finance. See note 3 supra.
The sharp divergence in effective tax rates paid in these two boroughs can be explained in
part by the differing property mixes. Manhattan contains a large proportion of office build-
ings which are taxed relatively heavily, while Staten Island consists largely of houses which
I I I I
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In contrast, Staten Island property owners, who now pay only a
fraction of their proportional share, would face a two-thirds in-
crease in taxes.
The implementation of a uniform tax system would do more
than change property taxes; it would likely affect property values.
Increases in taxes tend to lower the demand for property, thus de-
pressing market prices. This result in turn should lead to a down-
ward readjustment in assessed value, thereby offsetting part of the
initial tax increase. The opposite happens for those properties ex-
periencing a tax reduction.
This Article will explore several problems currently facing both
the City of New York and the state legislature in reforming New
York City's property tax. First, sections 306, 307 and 720 of the
Real Property Tax Law will be analyzed. Past attempts to enact a
fair and inexpensive remedy for taxpayers who feel their property
has been overvalued, without disfavoring the municipalities in-
volved, have led to the current situation. Second, this Article will
examine and comment on a number of suggestions developed to
help the City of New York resolve its property tax problems. The
current crisis created by Hellerstein and its progeny must be bro-
ken down into two separate issues: assessment and taxation. The
development of an equitable and efficient property tax system re-
quires the fair resolution of both of these concerns. The assessment
solutions which will be explored include full valuation, mathemati-
cal revaluation and individual revaluation. The taxation solutions
to be examined include classification of real property, the develop-
ment of a homestead exemption from property taxes combined
with a uniform tax, and the use of a circuit-breaker tax to ease the
burden of a property tax on low-income property owners. Any
changes in property tax procedures in the City of New York, or
any other taxing jurisdiction for that matter, must be accompanied
by substantial efforts to cure existing disparities in assessments as
to property type and borough of location. The intra-class or inter-
borough differences must be cured. Otherwise, the number and
cost of individual tax appeals in New York City will increase.
are taxed relatively lightly. After controlling for these differences, a strong difference among
the boroughs still exists.
1981]
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II. Section 306 and Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of
Islip
Section 306 of the Real Property Tax Law, whose origins can be
7. EFFECTIVE PROPERTY TAX RATzS By BOROUGH
50% Above
Citywide
Average
50% below
I I I I
Manhattan Bronx Brooklyn Queens Staten Island
Source: Estimates computed by the author from data furnished by the New York City De-
partment of Finance
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traced to the eighteenth century,8 requires the assessment of all
real property at its full market value.e While the requirements of
section 306 seem clear, in practice its application has been any-
thing but consistent. In fact, until Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of
Islip, the practice in New York was to assess property at some
fraction of full value in an inconsistent, undisciplined manner.10 In
Hellerstein, a taxpayer in the Town of Islip brought suit seeking to
have the township's assessment roll declared void because the roll
was not determined in accordance with section 306.1 In sustaining
the taxpayer's challenge, the court of appeals rejected the three
arguments that have been traditionally used to justify fractional
assessment. First, previous decisions which have held that assess-
ments must be at uniform rate for every type of property in the
assessing unit have been construed by other courts to imply that
section 306 does not mandate full value assessments. 2 The Heller-
stein court rejected this interpretation and the misplaced reliance
by lower courts on C.H.O.B. Associates v. Board of Assessors.'3
Second, it was argued that the establishment of the State Board of
Equalization and Assessment was indicative of the legislature's in-
8. Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 4, 332 N.E.2d at 280, 371 N.Y.S.2d
at 390.
9. N.Y. REAL PRoP. TAx LAW § 306 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See Merrick Holding
Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 45 N.Y.2d 538, 541, 382 N.E.2d 1341, 1342, 410 N.Y.S.2d 565,
566 (1978) ("The command of section 306 of the Real Property Tax Law that all property
be assessed at full value does not pronounce an inelastic approach to valuation. Nor does
the legislative directive specify a particular method for establishing value."); Xerox Corp. v.
Ross, 71 A.D.2d 84, 86, 421 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (4th Dep't 1979); River House-Bronxville, Inc.
v. Hoffman, 101 Misc. 2d 422, 424, 421 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
10. Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 4, 332 N.E.2d at 281, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 390 ("the custom of fractional assessment appears to be as old as the stat-
ute .... "). See Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d 637, 639, 412 N.Y.S.2d
293, 295; 860 Executive Towers v. Board of Assessors, 53 A.D.2d 463, 471, 385 N.Y.S.2d 603,
610 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd sub nom. Pierre Pellaton Apts., Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 43
N.Y.2d 769, 372 N.E.2d 801, 401 N.YS.2d 1013 (1977).
11. Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 3, 332 N.E.2d at 280, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 389.
12. Id. at 7-8, 332 N.E.2d at 283, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 393-95. See, e.g., McAlevey v. Wil-
liams, 41 A.D.2d 971, 344 N.Y.S.2d 193 (2d Dep't 1973); Margeson v. Smith, 41 A.D.2d 896,
342 N.Y.S.2d 727 (4th Dep't 1973); Town of Huntington v. State Bd. of Equal. and Assess-
ment, 81 Misc. 2d 457, 461, 365 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939 (Sup. Ct. 1975); C.H.O.B. Assoc. v. Board
of Assessors, 45 Misc. 2d 184, 257 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 22 A.D.2d 1015, (2d Dep't
1964), af'd, 16 N.Y.2d 779, 209 N.E.2d 820, 262 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1965).
13. Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 7, 332 N.E.2d at 283, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 393.
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tent that assessments need be made only at a uniform percentage
of full value."4 The court, in response to this contention, stated
[tihe only significance the [State Equalization and Assessment Board] has
in relation to this problem is found in Section 720 of the Real Property Tax
Law which permits a taxpayer in an inequality proceeding to rely on the
ratio established by the board in proving his claim. But this provision was
merely designed to ease the taxpayers' burden of proof in inequality cases
which . . . is not premised on the legality of fractional assessments.e
Third, and perhaps most important, the practice of fractional as-
sessments has continued for some two hundred years despite the
statutory standard of section 306 that "all real property in each
assessing unit shall be assessed at the full value thereof."" The
court faced with a centuries-old tradition of fractional assessment,
simply stated that the clear and unambiguous language of section
306 "'must not be smothered by the accumulation of customs or
violations.' ",17
Having disposed of these arguments, the Hellerstein court pro-
ceeded to examine the statutory and theoretical underpinnings of
fractional assessment. Although a majority of the states require as-
sessment at the equivalent of full or market value,"8 the trend is to
sanction fractional assessments." A number of factors explain the
continued practice of partial valuation.2 0 While noting the factors
14. Id. at 7, 332 N.E.2d at 282, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 393. See also Slewett & Farber v. Board
of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d at 647, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 300. The function of the State Board of
Equalization and Assessment ("SBEA") is set forth in § 1202 of the Real Property Tax Law.
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1202 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980). See notes 43-48 infra.
15. Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 9, 332 N.E.2d at 284, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 395 (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 13, 332 N.E.2d at 286, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 398. See In the Wake of Hellerstein,
supra note 1; Prospects for Full Value, supra note 1.
17. Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 10, 332 N.E.2d at 284, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 395 (quoting Wendell v. Lavin, 246 N.Y. 115, 120, 158 N.E. 42, 43 (1927)).
18. Id. at 10, 332 N.E.2d at 285, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 396. See Note, Inequality in Property
Tax Assessments: New Cures for an Old 11, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1374, 1377 n.28 (1962) [here-
inafter cited as Property Tax Assessments]. See also Inman & Rubinfeld, Judicial Pursuit
of Local Fiscal Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1701-05 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-611
(1976).
19. 37 N.Y.2d at 10, 332 N.E.2d at 285, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 396. See Comment, Tax Assess-
ments of Real Property: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 YALE L.J. 335, 387 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Tax Assessment of Real Property].
20. One commentator has noted:
There are several reasons for the persistence of partial valuation. Gullible taxpayers
associate a larger valuation with a larger tax, or at any rate are less contentious about
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which supported this practice," the court of appeals nevertheless
ruled that the taxpayer in Hellerstein was entitled to an order di-
recting the Town of Islip to make future assessments at full value
pursuant to section 306."2 By implication, the Hellerstein holding
required each assessing unit in the state to comply with the full
value standard within a reasonable period of time." This implica-
tion, however, has recently been brought into question.
In Matter of Colt Industries, Inc., it was held that the City of
New York has the power to "[firactionally assess and classify its
tax roll."' 24 In reaching its decision the court relied heavily upon
the long history of fractional assessments and classification within
the city, which was sanctioned by the state legislature.2 5 While
Colt Industries has recently been criticized,2 its continuing valid-
a relatively excessive assessment if it does not exceed their estimate of true value.
The ability to maintain a stable rate and to increase revenue by tampering with the
tax base - a change which calls for less publicity and less opposition - is naturally
desired. . . .Occasionally partial valuation is intended as a substitute for a varied
system of rates; i.e., different forms of property, while nominally taxed at the same
rate, are in fact taxed at differing rates by being assessed at different proportions of
full value.
1 J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 498 (1937). The confusing and misleading
nature of partial valuation has been recently noted in a study of New York City's property
tax. NEW YORK PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, INC., CITY OF UNEQUAL NEIGHBORS: A
STUDY OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY iii-iv (1980) [herein-
after cited as CITY OF UNEQUAL NEIGHBORS].
21. Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 13-i4, 332 N.E.2d at 286-87, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 398-99.
22. Id. at 14, 332 N.E.2d at 287, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
23. Id. See also Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1962) (state
given three years to comply with full value standard).
24. Matter of Colt Indus., Inc., N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1980, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
("[T]he historical development of present Administrative Code section 166-1.0 clearly indi-
cates the intention of the State legislature to establish a different standard of proof of ine-
quality in the City of New York and hence a different standard of assessment than is appli-
cable elsewhere in the State.").
25. Id. at 10, cols. 2-3. ("As of 1901, the City of New York had authority under special
legislation to fractionally assess, classify its tax rolls and equalize its assessments.").
26. In J.A. Green Constr. Corp. v. Finance Admin'r, No. 12468-71 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 15,
1980), the decision in Colt Industries was ignored. While Colt Industries had specifically
found § 307 of the Real Property Tax Law wholly inapplicable, Matter of Colt Indus., Inc.,
N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1980, at 10, col. 3, the court in J.A. Green found the City of New York to
be a "qualifying assessing unit" within the meaning of § 307(1). J.A. Green Const. Corp. v.
Finance Admin'r, mem. at 7. See also N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 307 (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981); M.R. Goldstein & M.J. Goldstein, Update on Equalization, Full- Value Assess-
ments, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 1981, at 2, cols. 3-5 [hereinafter cited as Update on Equalization].
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ity may help the city in its efforts to maintain its present assess-
ment standards.
III. Legal Remedies for Inequality and Overvaluation
Taxpayers seeking relief from an inequitable tax assessment at
the turn of the century were often saddled with the difficult
burden of establishing the illegality of an entire assessment roll
before individual relief could be obtained. 7 In Sioux City Bridge
v. Dakota County, the United States Supreme Court rejected this
approach, holding that an individual taxpayer may challenge an
unequal assessment.2 8 The Court stated:
The taxpayer's right is to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of
true value at which others are taxed, on the principle that where it is impos-
sible to secure both the standard of full or true value, and the uniformity
and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as
the just and ultimate purpose of the law."
A. Section 720
New York, in 1909, enacted a statute which permitted an indi-
vidual to challenge an unequal assessment but limited the type of
evidence admissible to do so.s0 The method chosen confined the
taxpayer to proving inequality, that is, an assessment made at a
higher proportionate valuation than other real property on the
same assessment roll,81 by comparison to appraisal of selected
parcels or to actual sales by random sampling.3 ' In 1961, the state
27. See generally Property Tax Assessments, supra note 18, at 1387-92. The Federal
Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), limits the ability of the federal courts to scruti-
nize local taxing practices. See Kitsner v. Milliken, 432 F. Supp. 1001, 1005 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, supra note 18, at 1701-04.
28. 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
29. Id. at 446. See also Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946). In Hillsborough,
the Court held it to be a denial of due process and equal protection to restrict a plaintiff
claiming unequal assessment to a public pleading in order to remedy alleged discriminatory
and arbitrary taxation. 260 U.S. at 447.
30. 1909 N.Y. Laws ch. 62 § 293 amended 1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 302 § 293.
31. See N.Y. REAL PRoP. TAx LAW § 706 (McKinney 1972).
32. The statute in part provided:
Upon such hearing the parties to the proceeding may mutually agree upon the num-
ber of pieces of property to be valued and the number of witnesses to be sworn on the
subject of the value of such properties. But in case the parties fail to so agree... the
court shall determine the number of witnesses to be sworn and the number of the
pieces of property to be valued and shall limit the same to such number as the court
shall deem reasonable.
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legislature amended this statute to allow either the taxpayer ap-
pealing his assessment or the municipality which must defend the
assessment, to present evidence of the state equalization rate
established for the roll containing the assessment under review.8
The purpose of the amendment was to reduce the expense of try-
ing an assessment review case. 4 Proponents of the amendment ar-
gued that small taxpayers in particular had effectively been denied
assessment reductions because of the prohibitive cost of bringing
an assessment appeal.85
In O'Brien v. Assessor, Town of Mamaroneck, the court of ap-
peals chose to interpret section 720 of the Real Property Tax Law
as merely authorizing the introduction of additional evidence and
held that proof of the state equalization rate alone, was insufficient
for determining inequality8
1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 302 § 293. See Town of Smithtown v. Moore, 11 N.Y.2d 238, 245-48, 183
N.E.2d 66, 69-71, 228 N.Y.S.2d 657, 662-664 (1962); People ex rel. Yarkas v. Kinnaw, 303
N.Y.224, 232, 101 N.E.2d 474, 477 (1951); People ex rel. Hagy v. Lewis, 280 N.Y. 184, 188,
20 N.E.2d 386, 387-88 (1939); Standard Brands v. Walsh, 92 Misc. 2d 903, 907-08, 402
N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See also Koeppel, Inequality in Real Property Tax Re-
view, 19 BuFFALO L. REV. 565, 569-82 (1970).
33. 1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 942. The statute in part provided "evidence may be given by
either party as to ... (2) the state equalization rate established for the roll containing the
assessment under review." The statute was enacted in part to blunt judicial criticism of the
state equalization rate. See People ex. rel. Yarkas v. Kinnaw, 303 N.Y. 224, 230, 101 N.E.2d
474, 476 (1951) ("While there is a superficial resemblance between 'inequality' and 'equali-
zation' - for both have reference to the relation between assessed values and full values of
property -'a county state equalization rate serves a function entirely distinct from that to
be served by the ratio fixed in inequality cases, and an equalization rate has no bearing
upon the issue presented in such cases." Yarkas was decided at a time when "the methods
employed in arriving at State equalization rates for counties and cities ... lacked probative
force on the issues raised in an inequality case." Wein v. Tax Comm'n, 52 Misc. 2d 124, 125,
275 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Improvements in the means for determining the
equalization rate gave the legislature the confidence to enact the 1961 amendments. Id. at
126, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 104. See generally J. FLYNN, CERTIORARI: A REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE
AND JUDiciAL REvIEw OF REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS.44-46 (N.Y.S. LEG. Doc. 1980) [here-
inafter cited as CERTIORARI].
34. See Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d at 648, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 295
(proof of assessment ratio by sample parcel method before chapter 942 was too costly and
usually beyond the means of the average taxpayer). In 860 Executive Towers, Inc. v. Board
of Assessors, 53 A.D.2d 463, 385 N.Y.S.2d 604 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd sub nom. Pierre Pel-
laton Apts., Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 43 N.Y.2d 769, 372 N.E.2d 801, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1013
(1977), a tax appeal occurring subsequent to the enactment of chapter 942, the taxpayer still
incurred costs in excess of $435,000 attempting to establish an unequal assessment.
35. CERTIORARI, supra note 33, at 45-46.
36. O'Brien v. Assessors, Town of Mamaroneck, 20 N.Y.2d 587, 232 N.E.2d 844, 285
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In response to O'Brien, the legislature again amended section
720(3), this time to supersede O'Brien.3 7 The language of sub-
division three was changed to deemphasize the method of apprais-
ing selected parcels as the principal method of proving inequality.
The legislature's intent was to expressly provide taxpayers and as-
sessing units with probative evidence which would be both inex-
pensive and effective. "
This amendment, however, did not lead courts to sanction the
use of the equalization rate or actual sales (as opposed to use of
the method of appraising selected parcels) until 1974.
In Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold,39 the court of appeals con-
sidered the types of proof admissible to determine the ratio of
assessed value to fair market value4 0 in an inequality proceeding
brought under New York's Real Property Tax Law.4'1 Although the
petitioner in Guth had submitted the types of proof permitted by
the statute, including selected parcels,42 actual sales43 and the state
N.Y.S.2d 843 (1967).
37. 1969 N.Y. Laws ch. 302.
38. Id. The statute in part provided "whether or not parcels are selected as hereinabove
provided, evidence may be given by either party as to . . . (2) the state equalization rate
established for the roll containing the assessment under review." The amendment in effect,
allowed a taxpayer to rely exclusively on the state equalization rate to establish inequality.
See Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1974).
39. 41 A.D.2d 479, 344 N.Y.S.2d 270 (4th Dep't 1973), afl'd, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d
441, 358 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1974).
40. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 720(3) (McKinney 1972).
41. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 706 (McKinney 1972). Under § 706, a taxpayer can
challenge an assessment on the grounds that the assessment was 1) illegal, 2) erroneous
because of overvaluation or 3) unequal in that the property had been assessed at a higher
proportionate valuation than other properties on the same tax roll. For the purposes of this
Article only inequality will be considered. In an inequality proceeding, the "petitioner must
prove a proper ratio of assessed value, and then he must establish the fair market value of
the property. Proof of these two points then leads to the application of a simple arithmetic
process whereby ratio times market value equals proper assessed valuation." Ed Guth Re-
alty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d at 446, 315 N.E.2d at 44, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
42. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 720(3) (McKinney 1972). See, e.g., Wolf v. Assessor,
Town of Hanover, 308 N.Y. 416, 126 N.E.2d 537 (1955); Westbury Drive-In v. Board of
Assessors, 70 Misc. 2d 1077, 1079-80, 335 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (" 'The value of
the land is generally estimated by comparing the subject property with similar property in
the area, and making adjustments for the differences between the subject and the compari-
son property.'" (quoting FRIEDMAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISING 52)).
43. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 720(3) (McKinney 1972). See, e.g., Standard
Brands, Inc. v. Walsh, 93 Misc. 2d 903, 402 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Mid-Island Shop-
ping Plaza, Inc. v. Podeyn, 14 A.D.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 249 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 966,
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equalization rate," the question before the court was whether the
equalization rate could be used as sole evidence of inequality.45
The court unanimously approved the practice of relying exclusively
on the state equalization rate because it constituted a fair and in-
expensive review process which "would tend to greatly simplify
and narrow the scope of these [inequality] proceedings."'46 In addi-
tion, the court recognized the legislature's assertion that the equal-
ization rates more accurately reflect the assessed value/full value
ratio than do use of either the actual sales or selected parcels
methods. 47
The ratio concept has been further clarified since Guth. In
180 N.E.2d 63, 224 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1961).
44. An equalization rate is a measurement of the relationship of total taxable assessed
value to total taxable full value in an assessing unit. N.Y. STATE Div. OF EQUAL. AND ASSESS-
MENT, THE EQUALIZATION RATE IN THE PROPERTY TAX: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES, 3
(1976). These rates are established by the State Board of Equalization and Assessment
("SBEA"). N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 202(1)(b) (McKinney 1972). For the general statu-
tory provisions relating to the SBEA, see id. §§ 200-216 (McKinney 1972 and Supp. 1980).
45. In O'Brien v. Assessor, Town of Mamaroneck, 20 N.Y.2d 587, 232 N.E.2d 844, 285
N.Y.S.2d 843 (1967), the court had concluded that proof of the state equalization rate,
standing alone, was insufficient to sustain a finding of inequality. "[E]ven where it is admis-
sible . . . its value must have a guarded acceptance." 20 N.Y.2d at 595-96, 232 N.E.2d at
848, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 848-49. This decision prompted the legislature to further amend
§ 720(3). Language was inserted in the statute to remove the previous requirement for the
selection of parcels to prove inequality.
46. 34 N.Y.2d at 450, 315 N.E.2d at 445, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 373. The court did not hold
that the assertion of validity by the taxpayer of the use of the state rate is irrebutable.
Rather, "the taxing authority will always be entitled to show [after the taxpayer has proved
that the rate's use is justified] that the equalization ratio is inappropriate to the taxing unit,
to the categ(ry of property involved and to the particular property or any other valid reason
which would affect its relevancy or weight." 34 N.Y.2d at 451, 315 N.E.2d at 445, 358
N.Y.S.2d at 373. In fact, it was held both in Swanz v. Brant, 52 A.D.2d 1071, 384 N.Y.S.2d
607 (4th Dep't 1976) and in Standard Brands, Inc. v. Walsh, 92 Misc. 2d 903, 402 N.Y.S.2d
264 (Sup. Ct. 1977), that evidence of actual contemporaneous sales was more reflective of
the true ratio of assessed valuation to full valuation in the taxing unit than the SBEA rate.
As was stated in 860 Executive Towers, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 53 A.D.2d 463, 471, 385
N.Y.S.2d 604, 609 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd sub nom. Pierre Pellaton Apts., Inc. v. Board of
Assessors, 43 N.Y.2d 769, 372 N.E.2d 801, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1977): "One could . . . hy-
pothesize . . . that the State rate might be inappropriate to prove ratio where the property
under review constitutes a relatively large percentage of the taxing unit's total assessed val-
uation .. " See also Merrick Holding Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 76 Misc. 2d 754, 351
N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
47. Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d at 451, 315 N.E.2d at 445, 358 N.Y.S.2d
at 373. See Town of Huntington v. State Bd. of Equal. and Assessment, 81 Misc. 2d 457,
461, 365 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 53 A.D.2d 6, 385 N.Y.S.2d 389 (2d Dep't
1976); Prospects for Full Value, supra note 1, at 278.
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McCrory Corp. v. Gingold,48 the Fourth Department held that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the City of Syracuse from re-
litigating the ratio issue because the city had had full and fair op-
portunity to be heard in prior proceedings in which the issue had
been determined with specificity. 4' In 860 Executive Towers, Inc.
v. Board of Assessors,"' the Second Department held that Guth
was applicable to other assessing jurisdictions throughout the
state.51 In addition, the court in 860 Executive Towers stated that
challenges by an individual assessing unit to the SBEA's methodol-
ogy "should be made in the statutorily provided hearings before
the SBEA and not in the courts upon a certiorari proceeding. 5
2
Due to the increase in successful tax certiorari proceedings and
the potential liabilities to municipalities throughout the state cre-
ated by these appeals, the legislature in 1977 again amended sec-
tion 720(3), to allow either the taxpayer or a municipality to intro-
duce evidence concerning the methodology and applicability of the
state equalization rate to a particular proceeding.53 Subdivision
three was amended to read:
The parties shall be limited in their proof ... [but] evidence may be given
by either party as to ... (2) the State equalization rate established for the
roll containing the assessment under review, with particular reference to
the information developed by the state board with respect to the ratio of
assessments to market values for each major type of taxable real property
pursuant to section twelve hundred of this chapter."
48.. 52 A.D.2d 23, 382 N.Y.S.2d 407 (4th Dep't 1976).
49. Id. at 25-26, 382 N.Y.S.2d, at 409-10. See 860 Executive Towers v. Board of Asses-
sors, 53 A.D.2d at 475-76, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 612; cf. People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 344,
406 N.E.2d 783, 789, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 933 (1980) (collateral estoppel arises out of a long
recognized equitable reaction against allowing a party to relitigate a matter); Guard-Life v.
Parker Mfg., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 196, 406 N.E.2d 445, 452, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 635 (1980) (party
bound by arbitrator determination in a prior proceeding). See generally Ufheil Constr. Co.
v. Town of New Windsor, 478 F. Supp. 766, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Schwartz v. Public Ad-
min'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969).
50. 53 A.D.2d 463, 385 N.Y.S.2d 604 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd sub nom. Pierre Pellaton
Apts., Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 43 N.Y.2d 769, 372 N.E.2d 801, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1977).
51. Id. at 471, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
52. Id. at 474, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 611. The court's rationale was premised on the limited
review of the state equalization rates permissible in certiorari proceedings. This fact offsets
the negative aspect of pursuing a rate objection before the SBEA, namely, the inability to
rechallenge the SBEA's methodology in a certiorari proceeding due to the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel.
53. 1977 N.Y. Laws chs. 888, 890.
54. Id. For a discussion of the origin of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment
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B. Section 307
The 1977 amendment created confusion and controversy, even
though it merely put both parties on an equal footing by emphasiz-
ing the municipality's right to introduce evidence challenging the
use of the equalization rate which was established in Guth.8 As a
result of the controversy, the 1977 amendment was repealed and
replaced by a new section, section 307 in 1978. Subdivision three of
section 307 stated:
Where the respondent in a tax review proceeding which is based in whole or
in part on a claim of inequality is an assessing unit whose standard of as-
sessment is set forth in subdivision two of this section [assessed at not more
than the full value thereof], the petition required by section seven hundred
six of this chapter shall allege, in addition to the contents otherwise re-
quired by such section, that the assessment has been made at a higher pro-
portionate valuation than the assessment of other taxable real property of
the same major type, as determined by the State Board of Equalization and
Assessment pursuant to section 1200 of this chapter, and evidence to such
effect may be introduced together with such evidence otherwise admissible
under subdivision three of section 720 of this chapter."
Under section 307, a taxpayer was only able to establish inequality
by reference to the ratio of the class of property to which his
property belonged, rather than by reference to the overall ratio de-
termined by the State Board of Equalization and Assessment
("SBEA"), or by the average ratios for all properties in the taxing
district determined by the alternate two methods of proof permis-
sible under section 720(3). sv In addition, section 307 enacted a
moratorium on the impact of full valuation. Section 307(1) allows
any assessing unit which undertakes a physical revaluation of all
its real property an exemption from the full value requirements of
section 3 06 ." At least one court has found that New York City is
entitled to avail itself of the protection of section 307(1).9 The
legislature considered section 307 to be remedial and thus retro-
and how the equalization rate is determined, see notes 44-46 supra.
55. CERTIORARi, supra note 33, at 52-53.
56. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 476; N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 307 (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981).
57. N.Y. RzAL PROP. TAX LAW § 307(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
58. Id. § 307(1).
59. See J.A. Green Constr. Corp. v. Finance Admin'r, No. 12468-71, mem at 6-7 (Sup.
Ct. Sept. 15, 1980).
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actively applicable to all pending certiorari proceedings. This as-
pect of section 307 has been declared unconstitutional.""
C. Chapter 126 and 127
In a retreat from prior legislation, the legislature, in its most re-
cent amendments to section 720, has enacted seemingly contradic-
tory provisions. Chapter 126, enacted in 1979, limited the types of
proof which a taxpayer (or municipality) could introduce on the
issue of inequality." Under section 720(3) a party could only es-
tablish an assessment ratio through either the appraisal of selected
parcels or by evidence of actual sales of real property within the
assessing unit that occurred during the year in which the assess-
ment under review was made.2 The effect of chapter 126 was to
disallow the use of the state equalization rate in an inequality
60. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 307(4)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). The state legis-
lature in an extraordinary session, extended the effective life of § 307 until May 15, 1981.
1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 880. See Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981,
at 5, col. 1 (2d Dep't Jan. 22, 1981); Rego Properties, Inc. v. Finance Admin'r, 102 Misc. 2d
641, 424 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
61. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 720(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) provides in part:
Evidence on the issue of whether an assessment is unequal shall be limited as herein-
after provided. The parties shall mutually agree ... [or] upon application of either
party the court or referee shall select the parcels to be appraised without reference to
their assessed values. . . . The parties shall be limited in their proof on the trial of
such issue to such parcels and witnesses, except that in any event, whether or not
parcels are selected as hereinabove provided, evidence may be given by either party
as to actual sales of real property within the assessing unit ...
Id.
62. The state legislature in amending § 720(3) determined that the state equalization
rate was not "capable of valid application to assessments of business and commercial
properties as well as residential properties in the particular assessing unit. Moreover, in
many instances the use of such equalization rate has not proven to be valid even in connec-
tion with the same types of property, and has often resulted in undesirable and unintended
results." 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 126 § 1. See Johnson v. Town of Haverstraw, 102 Misc. 2d 923,
927, 425 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Industrial and Research Assocs. v. Board of
Assessors, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 21, 1979, at 10, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 2, 1979). The state legislature
further noted:
The reason such equalization rate is inappropriate and invalid is that the equalization
rate established for the roll was never intended to determine property values for tax-
ing purposes, but was intended only to be used in connection with equalizing state
aid and to compute constitutional tax and debt limits. Therefore the use of such
equalization rate for the purpose of quantifying the ratio of assessment to market
value within a taxing district produces spurious and counter-productive results.
1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 126, § 1.
1981] REAL PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION
appeal.5
The legislature's reversion to stricter limitations on the type of
evidence allowed under section 720(3) was prompted by its contin-
ued desire to insulate municipalities from the fiscal impact of tax
inequality proceedings. Chapter 127, also enacted in 1979, was
adopted to protect private homeowners, whose property has tradi-
tionally been underassessed, from the tax shifts legislators had
feared would take place as a result of HeIlerstein." Under chapter
127, section 721 was established which provides:
Review of certain assessments. In any proceeding wherein the assessment
being reviewed has been challenged on the grounds that it is unequal and
where the real property is or has been improved by a residential structure
containing no niore than three dwelling units, at least one of which is occu-
pied by the petitioner, the court shall further permit the introduction of any
evidence deemed relevant and material to establishing the relationship be-
tween the assessed value and the market value of such real property not-
withstanding any provision of law to the contrary.8
Section 721 allows certain homeowners to introduce the state
equalization rate as evidence in an inequality proceeding. One
court, however, has found section 721 to be unconstitutional. In
Johnson v. Town of Haverstraw, it was held that because section
721 permits "one class of taxpayers to rely on evidence of the
[state equalization] ratio while prohibiting all others from using
63. 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 126; N.Y. REAL. PROP. TAX LAW § 720(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981). The legislature in amending § 720(3) specifically limited the period in which the
amendment would remain in effect until "December thirty-first, nineteen hundred eighty."
1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 127, § 5. This expiration date also applied to § 307, 1979 N.Y. Laws ch.
476, § 5, and § 721, 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 127, § 5. The state legislature extended the effective
life of § 307 until May 15, 1981, see 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 880, but neglected to do the same
for § 720(3) as amended and § 721. Accordingly, these sections are no longer in effect.
Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 4, col. 5 (2d Dep't). See
also note 72 infra and accompanying text.
64. The state legislature in Chapter 127 noted the continuing effort to "provide a rem-
edy which would enable the individual, residential owner-petitioner to assemble and present
in a summary and inexpensive manner evidence of inequality of assessment in review pro-
ceedings. . . ." 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 127, § 1. A recent study done by the New York Public
Interest Research Group, however, implicitly criticized the effectiveness of these efforts "the
antiquated system of fractional assessment rates so confuses homeowners that even if they
are concerned about their tax bill, they are at a loss to know how to challenge it." City of
Unequal Neighbors, supra note 20, at iii.
65. 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 127; N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 721 (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981). Section 721 expired on December 31, 1980. See Slewett & Farber v. Board of Asses-
sors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 4, col. 5 (2d Dep't).
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the same method of proof" the statute denies other taxpayers
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. 6
D. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessor8
In Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department, affirming a lower court decision, 7 held
unconstitutional subdivisions three, four and five of section 307.68
In Slewett, petitioners who owned large commercial properties in
Nassau County sought to have their properties reassessed, claiming
that their properties were "assessed at a higher ratio to fair market
value than other property in the county."69 The petitioners, by mo-
tion, had sought to introduce and use the tax rates established in
860 Executive Towers and the state equalization rate for the years
subsequent to that decision.70 The trial court, relying on the prin-
ciple of collateral estoppel, granted the motion."1 After this motion
was granted, the legislature significantly amended the require-
ments for proving inequality in a tax certiorari appeal.7 2 Nassau
County then sought to have the petitioners reform their petition to
conform with section 307. The trial court, after entertaining the
county's motion, held section 307 unconstitutional. The Second
Department sustained the trial court for three reasons. First, sec-
tion 307 constitutes an impermissible delegation of legislative pow-
ers to an administrative agency. 8
66. Johnson v. Town of Haverstraw, 102 Misc. 2d at 931-32, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 198; (Sup.
Ct. 1980); Industrial and Research Assocs. v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1979, at
10, col. 1. See also Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 5, col.
1 (2d Dep't).
67. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d 637, 412 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct.
1979).
68. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 5, col. 1, (2d Dep't
Jan. 22, 1981).
69. Id. at 4, col. 1.
70. Id.
71. Id. See 860 Executive Towers v. Board of Assessors, 53 A.D.2d at 475-76, 385
N.Y.S.2d at 612; note 49 supra.
72. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 4, col. 1 (2d
Dep't). The state legislature amended § 720(3) in 1978 and 1979, see 1978 N.Y. Laws, ch.
476; 1979 N.Y. Laws chs. 126, 127, in each instance dramatically altering the evidence ad-
missible in an inequality appeal. See generally notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
The legislature also added § 307 during this period. 1979 N.Y. Laws chs. 126, 127. See gen-
erally notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
73. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 26, 1981, at 5, col. 1 (2d Dep't).
See Rego Properties Corp. v. Finance Admin'r, 102 Misc. 2d 641, 644, 424 N.Y.S.2d 621, 625
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In support of the legislature's delegation of authority pursuant
to subdivision three, it was argued that the statute by referring to
classes determined by the SBEA cured its indefiniteness. This
argument fails for two reasons. First, the classes referred to in sub-
division three were never intended to serve as formulations for the
assessment of property taxes.74 The SBEA, pursuant to section
1200 of the Real Property Tax Law, began segregating real prop-
erty, not for the purpose of assessment, but rather as a means of
improving the statistical accuracy of the state equalization rate.7 5
The argument that subdivision three is an expression of the legis-
lature's intent to rewrite section 1200 runs contrary to settled rules
of statutory construction.71 Even if subdivision three were consid-
ered a legislative undertaking to define property classes, "[t]here is
no legislative restriction on the ability of the SBEA to reclassify
property tomorrow, if that agency, in its sole discretion, deter-
mines the necessity of such action."' 7 Second, the mere reference
to a rubric for segregating real property does not satisfy the legisla-
ture's obligation to define property classes for the purposes of tax-
ation.78 The New York State Constitution clearly defines the legis-
(Sup. Ct. 1980). See also N.Y. CoNSr. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of this state shall
be vested in the Senate and Assembly... .The power to lay a tax, to determine the pro-
portion thereof to be exacted from specified individuals or groups, to determine its inci-
dence, is exclusively a legislative function.").
74. See Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d at 647, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 299
(Sup. Ct. 1979).
75. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1200 (McKinney 1972). The counsel to the SBEA
criticized this aspect of § 307 in a memorandum to Governor Carey, asserting
this language assumes that a ratio of assessed to market value for each major type of
property is determined by the State Board for every assessment roll pursuant to sec-
tion 1200 of the Real Property Tax Law. This is not the case .... The State Board
does not determine ratios of assessed to market value for the major types of property
for any assessment roll: such determinations are made by staff only in conjunction
with statewide surveys for certain major property types (in accordance with State
Board procedures) .... Accordingly, the evidence to be introduced pursuant to sub-
division 3 of section 307 does not exist.
Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d at 649, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (emphasis
in original).
76. See N.Y. GEN. CONSTm. LAW § 95 (McKinney 1951). See also Slewett & Farber v.
Board of Asessors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 5, cols. 3-4 (2d Dep't) (Mangano, J., concur-
ring); People v. Heath, 77 Misc. 2d 215, 217, 352 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (Schuyler County Ct.
1974) (unless there is clear evidence of legislative design to repeal or modify earlier piece of
legislation, whole effect must be given to earlier statute).
77. Rego Properties Corp. v. Finance Admin'r, 102 Misc. 2d at 646, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
78. While the legislature may classify properties for tax purposes in any reasonable man-
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lature's obligation with respect to its taxing powers. Article XVI,
section one provides that "[a]ny laws which delegate the taxing
power shall specify the type of taxes which may be imposed there-
under and provide for their review. ' '7 9 Section two of Article XVI
in part provides: "The legislature shall provide for the supervision,
review and equalization of assessments for purposes of taxation." 80
The system envisioned by subdivision three fails to satisfy these
requirements. Subdivision three further appears to be inconsistent
with federal constitutional mandates. 1
Second, the Second Department upheld the trial court because
section 307(5) which retroactively applies the new requirements of
section 307 was "so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the con-
stitutional limitation [of due process]."82 Finally, the Second De-
ner of its choosing, see People ex rel. Hudson River Day Line v. Franck, 257 N.Y. 69, 177
N.E. 312 (1931), and impose a heavier burden on certain types of properties, see Long Is-
land Lighting Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 45 N.Y.2d 529, 535, 382 N.E.2d 1337, 1339, 410
N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (1978); Shapiro v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 96, 103, 296 N.E.2d 230,
234, 343 N.Y.S.2d 323, 328, appeal dismissed for want of a sub. fed. question, 414 U.S. 804
(1973), the legislature cannot abrogate its responsibility and leave the difficult determina-
tion of property classification to an administrative agency; cf. Nicholas v. Kahn, 47 N.Y.2d
24, 31, 389 N.E.2d 1086, 1089, 416 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1979) ("[T]he Legislature cannot
delegate its lawmaking power to an administrative agency .... The cornerstone of adminis-
trative law is derived from the principle that the Legislature may declare its will, and after
fixing a primary standard, endow administrative agencies with the power to fill in the inter-
stices in the legislative product. . . ."). See also Ames Volkswagen, Ltd. v. Tax Comm'n, 47
N.Y.2d 345, 349, 391 N.E.2d 1302, 1304, 418 N.Y.S.2d 324, 327 (1979).
79. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1, See generally Sommax, Inc. v. City of New York, 43
N.Y.2d 253, 257, 372 N.E.2d 9, 11, 401 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (1977); Rab Co. v. Tompkins
County Bd. of Assessment Review, 68 A.D.2d 374, 375, 417 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (3d Dep't
1979).
80. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
81. The lack of ascertainable standards necessary for the classification of real property
violates the commands of the fourteenth amendment. In Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp.
615 (M.D. Ala. 1971), the court in construing a classification scheme more narrowly defined
than § 307 concluded that "[v]esting such wide discretion in the hands of tax officers, no
matter how good their motives, necessarily will result in an arbitrary and discriminatory
system of taxation." Id. at 625. Without any standards or guidelines, it would be difficult to
discern a rational basis for the classifications. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazor,
440 U.S. 568 (1979); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, (1973); Mc-
Carthy v. Jones, 449 F. Supp. 480 (S.D. Ala. 1978); Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn, 34
N.Y.2d 143, 313 N.E.2d 30, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1974).
82. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 26, 1981, at 5, col. 1 (quoting
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938)). See J.A. Green Constr. Corp. v. Finance Admin'r,
No. 12468-71 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 1980) mem. at 10-13. "This court opines and finds that
were it to apply Section 307(5) . .. [retroactively it] would deprive the petitioners of the
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partment construed the taxation scheme established in subdivision
three of section 307 as a classification system which violated the
clear and continuing mandate of full valuation.83
The classification of real property for the purposes of taxation is
clearly a legislative function."4 Subdivision three in effect, requires
proof of inequality by comparison to a particular class of property
rather than to all property within a district.8 5 While the legislature
has the power to delegate its powers to local governments," it can-
not do so without specific standards and guidelines.87 Subdivision
three does not define property classes, but instead makes reference
to classes as determined by the SBEA. Subdivision three, requires
the SBEA to establish a property classification scheme without any
guidelines.8"
right to be refunded the excess payment of taxes that accrued at the time the tax was paid
.Id. at 13
83. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 5, col. 1 (2d
Dep't). See also Rokowsky v. Finance Admin'r, 41 N.Y.2d 574, 576, 362 N.E.2d 974, 976-77,
394 N.Y.S.2d 176, 177-78 (1977). Generally, a classification scheme is one in which property
is grouped into various classes and "either assessed for tax purposes at different established
percentages of market value or taxed at different established rates." INT'L ASSOC OF ASSESS-
ING OFFICERS, CLASSIFIED PROPERTY TAX SYSTEMS IN THE U.S., RESEARCH AND INFORMATION
SERIES 1 (1979). The purpose of a classification system is to "influence the proportion of
taxes allocable to each of the various classes." Id. See N.Y.A. No. 10,000-b, 203d Sess. § 1
(Mar. 4, 1980) ("since [1960] eleven states and the District of Columbia have adopted classi-
fication systems when faced with the problems of full value assessments. These de jure clas-
sification systems were adopted specifically to prevent the interclass shifts that occur when
a full value standard is imposed....").
84. United States Steel Corp. v. Gerosa, 7 N.Y.2d 454, 459, 166 N.E.2d 489, 491, 199
N.Y.S.2d 475, 478 (1960). See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 501a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981)
("classification must be established by ordinance of the county board. If not so established,
the classification is void.").
85. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 26, 1981, at 5, col. 1; J.A.
Green Constr. Corp. v. Finance Admin'r, mem. at 8-10; Rego Properties Corp. v. Finance
Admin'r, 102 Misc. 2d at 645, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
86. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); City of Rochester v. Simpson, 134 N.Y.
414, 31 N.E. 871 (1892); Gulest Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209
N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), affd, 15 A.D.2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962).
87. "The Legislature must set bounds to the field, and must formulate the standards
which shall govern the exercise of discretion within the field." Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288,
299, 18 N.E.2d 281, 285 (1938). See Neshaminy, Inc. v. Hastings, 64 A.D.2d 830, 407
N.Y.S.2d 603 (4th Dep't 1978); cf. Harris v. Warde, 58 A.D.2d 51, 62, 395 N.Y.S.2d 283, 288
(4th Dep't 1977) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (discretion must be exercised within approved
formulated standards).
88. See Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 5, col. 1 (2d
Dep't); Rego Properties Corp. v. Finance Admin'r, 102 Misc. 2d at 645, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
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While discretion and flexibility are essential for the sound and
efficient management of a complex tax system like New York's,
this discretion must be tempered and regulated by the legislature.
Subdivision three fails to maintain this balance. Any legislation
which seeks to implement a classification scheme in New York
must be mindful of this balance not only to insure the legality of
such a system but also to insure against an unwarranted and un-
necessary increase in tax inequality appeals.89
Hellerstein and its progeny created two identifiable but analyti-
cally separable problems: assessment and taxation. The develop-
ment of an equitable and efficient property tax system requires the
resolution of both these concerns.' 0 The analysis which follows will
focus on the City of New York, where the greater difficulties with
the implementation of Hellerstein exist.'1 Not only is the potential
liability large, but the disparate assessment practices within the
five boroughs compound the problem.
IV. Assessments
There exist today glaring differences in the assessment of
properties within a given class in New York City. This variation in
assessment is as pronounced at the citywide level as it is in each
borough." This dispersion in effective tax rates is readily illus-
trated by examining the range of assessment ratios - assessed
value over market value - for single-family houses in Brooklyn."
Most of these properties have assessment ratios around twenty
percent, that is, the assessed value is approximately one-fifth of
89. One commentator has noted:
[T]he equity of a tax system is measured by the degree to which it has firmly incorpo-
rated a uniform tax base from which individual tax liability is ultimately determined.
Tax liability must be the result of principles of uniformity applied in each case in the
manner intended by the policies underlying those principles. The alternative is to
sanction a system which can only be described as lawless: arbitrary and capricious
determinations of tax liabilities, with the resultant intergovernmental, inter-class and
intra-class inequalities.
In the Wake of Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 857.
90. See N.Y. STATE Div. OF EQUAL. AND ASSESSMENT, REPORT ON PROPOSED REFORMS IN
REAL PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED REFORMS IN
PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION].
91. See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 3, 7 supra and accompanying text.
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the market value. The range of assessments is wide, however, and
as a result many properties are taxed much more heavily than
others. For example, over one-sixth of the properties are assessed
at more than thirty percent of their market values. 4 These proper-
ties pay effective tax rates that are at least twice those of the nine
percent of the properties which are assessed at less than fifteen
percent of their market values.9'
93. DISTRmUTION OF ASSESSMENT RATIOS FOR
ONE-FAMILY HOUSES IN BROOKLYN
Cumulative
Percentage Distribution
Assessment Ratios* of Total (in percent)
0.10-9.11 ............................................ 0.4 0.4
0.11-0.12 .............................................. 0.9 1.3
0.12-0.13 ............................................. 1.6 2.9
0.13-0.14 ............................................. 2.5 5.4
0.14-0.15 ............................................. 3.4 8.9
0.15-0.16 ............................................. 4.6 13.4
0.16-0.17 ............ ................................ 6.0 19.5
0.17-0.18 ............................................. 6.7 26.2
0.18-0.19 ............................................ 8.4 34.6
0.19-0.20 ............................................ 6.4 40.7
0.20-0.21 .......................... ................... 7.4 48.1
0.21-0.22 ............................................ 6.9 54.9
0.22-0.23 ............................................. 5.0 60.0
0.23-0.24 ............................................. 5.0 65.0
0.24-0.25 ......................................... :... 4.4 69.4
0.25-0.26 ............................................. 4.2 73.6
0.26-0.27 ............................................. 2.7 76.3
0.27-0.28 ............................................. 2.4 78.7
0.28-0.29 ............................................. 2.1 80.8
0.29-0.30 ............................................. 1.8 82.6
0.3-0.4 ............................................... 9.3 92.0
0.4-0.5 ............................................... 3.0 95.0
0.5-0.6 .................... ........................... 1.9 97.0
0.6-0.7 ............................................... 1.1 98.0
0.7-0.8 ............................................... 0.6 98.6
0.8-0.9 ............................................... 0.4 99.0
0.9-1.0 ............................................... 0.3 99.3
1.0-2.0 ............................................... 0.7 100.0
'*Assessed value divided by market value
Source: Estimates derived by the author from data furnished by the New York City Depart-
ment of Finance.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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This lack of uniformity can be measured by the coefficient of
dispersion. This coefficient measures the closeness with which the
ratios of assessment to sales price, for a particular class of property
within the assessing unit, cluster around the mean ratio of assess-
ment to sales price in that unit. "The lower the coefficient, the
tighter the cluster and the more uniform the assessments are
within the unit." 6 The Bureau of the Census recognizes a coeffi-
cient of 0.209' and the SBEA recognizes a coefficient greater than
0.10 as indicative of unacceptable assessment practices. 6 The co-
efficient of dispersion for these Brooklyn properties is considerably
higher at 0.34.9 Similar degrees of dispersion exist within virtually
96. Prospects for Full Value, supra note 1, at 242.
97. See TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUES AND ASSESSMENT/SALES PRICE RATIOS, 1977 CENSUS
OF GOVERNMENTS 21-23. See also Tri-Terminal Corp. v. Borough of Edgewater, 68 N.J. 405,
413 n.4, 346 A.2d 396, 400 n.4 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
98. See N.Y. STATE Div. OF EQUAL. AND ASSESSMENT, THE QUALITY OF ASSESSMENT PRAC-
TICES IN NEW YORK STATE: COEFFICIENTS OF DISPERSION FOR RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 8 (June
1980); REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX 73 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX].
99. COEFFICIENTS OF DISPERSION* BY MAJOR
BUILDING TYPE AND BOROUGH
Building Type Manhattan Bronx Brooklyn Queens Staten Island
One-family houses ............. 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.24 0.27
Two-family houses.............. 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.31 0.26
Walk-up apartments ........... 0.40 0.53 0.46 0.35 0.55
Elevator apartments ........... 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.20 #
Warehouse buildings ........... 0.46 0.45 0.34 0.39 #
Factory buildings .............. 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.32 #
Garages ....................... 0.30 0.78 0.51 0.54 0.73
Hotels ........................ 0.41 # # # #
Theatres ...................... # # # # #
Store buildings ................ 0.34 0.52 0.40 0.39 0.67
Loft buildings ................. 0.45 # # # #
Office buildings ................ 0.37 # # 0.38 #
Condominiums ................ 0.23 # # 0.15 #
Vacant land ................... 0.55 0.97 0.77 0.84 0.80
Miscellaneous ................. 0.46 0.70 0.58 0.41 #
*The coefficient of dispersion measures the deviation of the individual assessment ratios from the average
assessment ratio for the group as a whole. It is computed by dividing the average amount of these devia-
tions by the average assessment ratio, thereby making it useful. for comparing degrees of dispersion be-
tween groups with different average ratios.
#No coefficient of dispersion shown because of ten or fewer observations.
Source: Estimates derived by the author from data furnished by the New York City Department of
Finance.
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all property groups in the city. In only two instances is the coeffi-
cient of dispersion below the minimum level which the Census Bu-
reau considers acceptable. 100 The message is clear: there are wide
variations in New York City in the effective tax rates paid on simi-
lar properties.
The variations in assessments within a property class limit the
effectiveness of a classification scheme to prevent tax shifts. Since
each property cannot be assigned its own individual class, tax-
payers whose assessment ratio differs from the ratio for their class,
will still face tax changes. The tax changes under a classified
scheme, however, are generally less extreme than those caused by a
switch to a uniform tax. In some instances, the tax change may
actually be in the opposite direction. For example, taxes on proper-
ties now assessed at ratios above the city-wide average but below
the average for their class will rise instead of fall. If factory build-
ings were assigned a separate class, one-fifth of them would face a
tax increase of fifty percent or more.10 1 On the other hand, since
the average assessment ratio for factory buildings now exceeds the
citywide average, the switch to a uniform tax system would result
in major tax increases for only a few of these buildings.0 " Indeed,
the group of factory buildings as a whole would benefit from a
twenty-three percent tax reduction.10
A. Mathematical Revaluation
Many have argued that the city's property tax problems, can be
corrected by adjusting the assessed values of large numbers of
properties in groups. 104 If all the properties in a given property
class are assessed at the same fraction of market value, the use of a
single multiplicand brings assessed values to the desired stan-
dard.10' For example, if properties were assessed at one-fifth of
100. Id. Only assessments for condominiums in the Bronx and Queens fell within a range
which would satisfy the standards of the Census Bureau.
101. See note 3 supra. The author, using data provided by the New York City Finance
Department, placed all factory buildings in one class and then simulated the hypothetical
situation stated in the text.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., N.Y.A. No. 10,000-b, 203d Sess. § 310 (Mar. 4, 1980). This bill was intro-
duced by Assembly Speaker Stanley Fink and will hereinafter be referred to as the "Fink
Bill." See generally Update on Full Equalization, supra note 26, at 2, col. 4.
105. See THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE PROPERTY TAX CRISIS: AN ANALYSIS OF PUB-
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market value, then multiplication by a factor of five would ensure
compliance with a "full value" standard. Because this process
works by multiplying each of these properties by the same con-
stant, it is called mathematical revaluation. By proper choice of
factors, disparities in assessment, ratios between groups can be
eliminated.106
Although appealing in its simplicity, mathematical revaluation
suffers from a critical flaw: it leaves intra-group variations in
place. This is particularly disconcerting for New York City because
of the apparent impossibility of dividing tax rolls into groups
within which the ratios are uniform.0 7 Mathematical revaluation
merely perpetuates existing assessment disparities within groups,
and thus, similarly situated properties would continue to be taxed
at different rates. In fact, when combined with a classified tax sys-
tem, mathematical revaluation may serve only to prolong the pre-
sent distribution of taxes.1 08 When the same groupings are used as
the basis for both the revaluation process and the classification
scheme, every property continues to be taxed as before.
LIC POLICY APPROACHES TO CLASSIFICATION, NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY TASK FORCE ON
SCHOOL FINANCE AND REAL PROPERTY TAXATION 21 (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS-
LATIVE RESPONSE TO PROPERTY TAX CRISIS] ("Mathematical revaluation is a readily available
method of computing base value. . . .DEA can undertake a sample survey of property
classes as stipulated by the legislature in order to obtain a statistically significant assess-
ment ratio between the current assessment of such property and the market value of real
property in a particular class. By dividing each current assessment by the appropriate as-
sessment ratio for the class to which the property belongs, a base value assessment of the
property is obtained. This base value for each parcel is then multiplied by the class assess-
ment percentage to compute the taxable assessment. The tax due equals the taxable assess-
ment multiplied by the tax rate.").
106. See generally REPORT ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 98, at 62.
107. The possibility of devising a classification scheme which will divide the city's tax
rolls into groups containing uniform assessment ratios appears remote. The author, employ-
ing data provided by the Department of Finance failed to find any uniformity of assessment
ratios even after breaking down the data into 15 building types with as many as nine sub-
groups and into boroughs with as many as 18 community planning districts.
108. In the simplest case, the tax liability is unchanged if the factor used for the mathe-
matical revaluation is simply the inverse of the fraction used for the classification scheme.
For example, if a piece of property has an assessed value of 0.22, and is placed in a group
that is now on average assessed at 0.2, mathematical revaluation would require the property
to be multiplied by a factor of five to bring the average property in the group to full value.
The property in question would now be assessed at 1.10% of market value. If the same
property is then placed in a class for which property is fractionally assessed at one-fifth of
its fair market value then the process of multiplying by five and dividing by five would bring
the assessed value for tax purposes back to where it started, 0.22 of market value.
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Mathematical revaluation may also prompt many property
owners who are presently overassessed relative to other property
owners within the same class to avail themselves of the tax appeals
process. The consequences of a further flood of tax certiorari ap-
peals in New York City to both the courts and the city's financial
security cannot be ignored.1 " The potential for this increase in cer-
tiorari proceedings becomes clear with a simple example. Under
current assessment practices an owner may fail to realize his rela-
tive overtaxation. A property owner assessed at a ratio of 0.22 of
market value, and placed in a property class with an average as-
sessment ratio of 0.20, after revaluation will have his property will
be assessed at ten percent above its market value. Once the as-
sessed value exceeds the property's worth it is likely that the own-
er will become aware of the relative overassessment.110
The increase in the number of appeals is staggering. A rough es-
timate, based on the use of fifteen building classes, projects over a
quarter of a million appeals, including 180,000 appeals by home-
owners."' This estimation contrasts sharply with the current aver-
age of approximately 40,000 appeals per year,112 with only a few
thousand of these appeals coming from homeowners. 113 A sixfold
increase in the number of appeals would place an undue burden on
the city's Tax Commission, which must hear each appeal. If a clas-
109. See notes 111-115 infra and accompanying text.
110. By enlarging the overassessment from two percent of market value (22% minus
20%) to 10%, mathematical revaluation also increases the visibility of the gains to be won
through appealing the assessment. The actual tax reduction possible, however, remains the
same as long as the total tax on the group is unchanged. While the amount of the over-
assessment for a property worth $40,000 would increase from $800 to $4,000, the tax rate
needed to raise the same revenue would have fallen by four-fifths.
111. Estimate derived by author from information furnished by the New York City De-
partment of Finance. See note 3 supra. These estimates were calculated by extrapolating
the results obtained from the sales data to the tax rolls as a whole. All owners of properties
relatively overassessed by 10% or more compared with their class average (there were
fifteen classes based on building type) were assumed to appeal. To arrive at the estimated
loss to the city's tax base, it was assumed that each of the appeals resulted in a reduction of
the property's assessed value to a level commensurate with the average assessment ratio for
the class as a whole. The percentage of reductions of total assessed value for each of 75
subdivisions of the sales data (15 building types in five boroughs) were then extrapolated to
cover all the properties on the tax roll.
112. Telephone interview with Mary E. Manne, President, Tax Commission of the City
of New York, in New York City (Feb. 17, 1981). For the 1980 hearing period, the Tax Com-
mission handled 2,857 applications from one and two-family homeowners.
113. Id.
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sification scheme with fewer classes were employed, the number of
appeals could be even higher.1" Further, to the extent that these
appeals are successful, mathematical revaluation will reduce the
city's tax base. If the assessed value reductions are granted in all
the appeals estimated above, the loss to the city's tax rolls could
amount to almost seventeen percent.11
B. Individual Revaluation
To reduce the potential for certiorari appeals, it is necessary to
eliminate the disparities in assessment ratios. The only feasible
way to do this is to reappraise each property individually. This
could prove to be a lengthy and expensive undertaking. Individual
reassessment is not all that is required in order to insure intra-
group equality; assessments must be maintained over time to keep
pace with inflation."16 Through careful planning, the tasks of reap-
praising properties and of establishing a system to maintain the
integrity of the tax roles can be combined, thus substantially re-
ducing the costs of doing each separately."
114. If fewer classes are used, the dispersion between classes will be greater, see gener-
ally notes 96-103 supra and accompanying text, thereby increasing the likelihood of appeal.
115. Estimate derived by author from information furnished by the New York City
Department of Finance. See note 111 supra.
116. See Future of the Property Tax, supra note 2, at 10-17. See also Tri-Terminal
Corp. v. Borough of Edgewater, 68 N.J. at 409-14, 346 A.2d at 399-401; WHO PAYS THE
PROPERTY TAX, supra note 4.
Inept and fragmented administration imposes unequal burdens on households in
otherwise identical circumstances .... But capricious or clumsy administration in-
troduces new inequities continuously, especially when relative property values change
rapidly. Furthermore, bad administration deprives the property tax of legitimacy
among taxpayers. Administrative tools are at hand, and are being introduced in some
jurisdictions, that permit frequent and accurate revaluation with fewer costly on-site
inspections. Providing full information on assessment methods and on opportunities
for quick, cheap appeals by disgruntled taxpayers can help legitimize the property
tax.
Id. at 94. As one state agency has cogently noted, "[tlhe ability of local governments to
administer equitably [a] property tax on a continuous basis will largely depend on the de-
gree of professionalization of the local assessment function." N.Y. STATE Div. oF EQUAL. AND
ASSESSMENT, REPORT ON PROPOSED REFORMS IN REAL PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION 13
(Feb. 1980).
117. At present, the city's Real Property Assessment Bureau does not appear able to
handle the tasks of appraisal and of updating assessments. In fact, the Bureau has been
found to be deficient in even the most basic kinds of bookkeeping functions. See OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER, STATE OF NEW YORK, ASSESSMENT PRACTICES OF THE BUREAU OF REAL
PROPERTY ASSESSMENT, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Audit Report NYC-66-76
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Moving to a more equitable property tax system without endan-
gering the fiscal integrity of the city is possible, but the reform will
not be painless. There are several options, however, to reduce the
hardship on individual property owners." 8
(Nov. 1, 1978). Not all responsibility for the present disarray of the tax rolls rests with the
Bureau's procedures. The Bureau has only some 125 field assessors to review annually the
assessments on the city's 830,000 parcels. Priorities have had to be set, with the result that
some properties were not assessed even when they were sold. It has been claimed that if
"New York City assessors revalued all parcels annually, they would spend less than 10 min-
utes on each." Future of the Property Tax, supra note 2, at 7.
In order to successfully implement any assessment reforms, the city must move to com-
puterized mass appraisal systems (CAMA), which are being employed in other states. See,
e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-680 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Computerization will help alleviate
much of the paperwork and many of the value judgments now involved in appraisal work.
See PROPERTY ASSESSMENT VALUATION, supra at 308. Greater use of computers to store and
process data on each property should also help control one of the major sources of disper-
sion in assessment ratios; the delays in reassessing properties following changes in their
market values. Id. at 310; REPORT ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 98, at 42-44. See
also Essex County Bd. of Taxation v. City of Newark, 73 N.J. 69, 72, 372 A.2d 607, 608
(1977) ("periodic revaluations are an absolute essential, particularly in times of continuous
fluctuations of realty values. . . ."). Increased reliance on computers to store and process
data on each property should also help control one of the major sources of dispersion in
assessment ratios - the delays in reassessing properties following changes in their market
values. PROPERTY AssEssmoNT VALUATIONS, supra at 310; NEw YORK STATE Div. oF EQUAL.
AND ASSESSMENT, REPORT ON PROPOSED REFORMS IN REAL PROPERTY TAx ADMINISTRATION 14-
15 (Feb. 1980). Lags in reassessing properties cause assessment ratios to fall (rise) as their
values in the marketplace decrease (increase). Although the exact importance of lags is hard
to show without information on the movements over time and information concerning the
price and assessed value for specific properties, many characteristics of the tax rolls suggest
that lags are a major source of dispersion. For example, the generally high level of the ratios
for properties in the Bronx may reflect a failure by the city to readjust promptly and fully
the assessed values as properties fall in price. In contrast, the low average assessment ratios
for one- and two-family houses can be traced to the absence of any comprehensive program
to reassess these properties since World War II. See Future of the Property Tax, supra note
2, at 7 ("During the 1960's, city assessors say, the unofficial but explicit city practice was to
avoid any changes in residential assessments.") The only area of the city which appears to
have received the most attention from the Real Property Assessment Bureau is Manhattan,
and its high average assessment ratio, the nearest of all the boroughs to the "full value"
standard reflects this fact. See note 6 supra.
118. See generally notes 119-143 infra and accompanying text. For example, classifying
real estate into groups can prevent shifts in taxes among these groups thereby reducing the
extreme changes in taxes. See notes 4, 83 supra and accompanying text. A phase-in program
with a tax deferment for the elderly could then ease the adjustment to the tax changes that
remain. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-9-10 (Cum. Supp. 1979); CAL. REv. & TAX CODE §§ 20501-
20544 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 467 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-670-672 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See generally Future of the Property
Tax, supra note 2, at 19-20.
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V. Taxation
A. Classification
To avoid the enormous tax shifts associated with full market
value assessment, the state legislature has a number of options to
modify the present property tax laws. The simplest and most di-
rect way to lessen the tax shifts among property groups is to estab-
lish a classified tax system. Under a classified system, properties
are divided into selected tax groups. The assessment standard or
tax rate can then be adjusted to the current effective tax rate so
that the total taxes paid by each group of properties is unchanged.
Preventing any reallocation of property taxes requires each prop-
erty now taxed at a different effective rate to be placed in a sepa-
rate class. There are, however, practical limits on the number of
classes that can be established. Therefore, it may not be possible
to eliminate all tax shifts through classification. While it is clear
that a classification scheme by a state legislature could survive
both federal and state constitutional challenge,11' constitutional
and administrative difficulties will persist1 20 if there exists wide
variances in the valuation of similar properties situated within the
same class. 12 1 It has been the experience of a number of other
states which have adopted a classification scheme for administer-
ing property taxes that there must be uniformity in the assessment
of real property within a class whether it be at full value or some
fraction thereof.1
22
119. See Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959) (A state tax law is not arbi-
trary although it discriminates "in favor of a certain class ... if the discrimination is
founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy." (citations omitted));
Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954) ("Equal protection does not require
identity of treatment. It only requires that the classification rest on real and not feigned
differences. . . .); Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615, 621 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See also
Apache County v. Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry., 106 Ariz. 356, 476 P.2d 657 (1970), appeal
dismissed for want of a sub. fed. question, 401 U.S. 1005 (1971); Acorn v. City of New
Orleans, 377 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (La. 1979) (Summers, C.J., dissenting); Keniston v. Board of
Assessors, Mass Adv. Sh. 1485, 407 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (1980); Associated Indus. of Mass.,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Rev., Mass Adv. Sh. 2027, 393 N.E.2d 812, 817 (1979); Slewett &
Farber v. Board of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d at 643-44, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
120. See McCarthy v. Jones, 449 F. Supp. 480 (S.D. Ala. 1978).
121. See generally Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 11-12, 132 N.W.2d 394, 402
(1964); Hamm v. State, 255 Minn. 64, 67-68, 95 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1959).
122. Alabama, until 1978, required all property to "be assessed to the fair and reason-
able market value of such property," ALA. CoDE § 40-8-1(a) (1977), before a classification
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The principal difficulty with a classification system is construct-
ing a system with an appropriate number of classes which will
shield certain properties from the onerous burden of full valuation,
while adhering to the requirement of intra-class uniformity."8s
Bills currently before the state legislature suggest that nine classes,
with possible further subclassifications be employed."s4 The SBEA
currently divides real property into seven groups'"and property
within the City of New York into 25 major classes."" Even if a
ratio could be applied. Alabama, however, allowed different counties to assess properties
within the same class at different ratios. AA. CODE § 40-8-4 (1977). This classification
scheme has been found to be violative of both the Alabama state constitution and the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution. McCarthy v. Jones, 449 F. Supp. at
482-83. California requires assessors to assess "all property subject to general property taxa-
tion at - its full value." CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 401 (West Supp. 1980) (omission in
statute). This same section prior to 1981 required assessment at "25 percent of its full
value." Id. (omission in statute). Massachusetts preconditioned the implementation of a
classification scheme upon each municipality's revaluation of property at fair cash value,
and then having this revaluation certified by the appropriate local court. MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 59A, § 42 (West Supp. 1980). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
found this scheme to be constitutional. Associated Indus. of Mass., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Rev., Mass. Adv. Sh. 2027, 393 N.E.2d 812 (1980). Minnesota by statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. §
273.11 (West Supp. 1979), requires assessment at full value, or at a uniform percentage
thereof, i.e., at adjusted market value before a classification ratio could be applied. Id. See
In the Wake of Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 286.
123. A number of studies of this problem have concluded that the largest tax shifts will
come from intra-class equalization rather than through inter-class equalization. See N.Y.
STATE Div. OF EQUAL., 1980 REVALUATIONS PROPERTY TAx SHIFT ANALYSIS 5-7 (1980) ("Intra-
class changes far outweigh the overall shift in tax burdens between the residential and other
classes of property"); N.Y. STATE Div. OF EQUAL. AND AssEssMENT, 1979 REVALUATIONS
PROPERTY TAX SHiFr ANALYSIS 2, 4-8 ("the shifts within classes are far more important than
the shifts between classes").
124. The bill introduced by Assembly Speaker Fink, would not only allow for the classi-
fication of real property, N.Y.A. No. 10,000-b, 203d Sess. (March 4, 1980) § 3, tit. II, but
would amend the existing homestead exemption and tax appeal process, Id. §§ 5-9, See
generally Comment, New York's Tax and Debt Limits and Classified Property Tax Assess-
ments: Time for a Constitutional Amendment?, 9 FORDHAM URw. L.J. 627 (1981) for a dis-
cussion of the implication of this bill's classification scheme on New York's constitutional
debt and tax limitations. Under the Fink Bill, real property would be classified as either
residential, apartment, commercial, industrial, agricultural, vacant, railroad, utility, or spe-
cial franchise. N.Y.A. No. 10,000-b § 312(a)-(i) (1980). The bill would also allow the City of
New York to subelassify real property into four classes and any other assessing unit outside
the city into two classes. Id. § 312(3)(a), (b). See also Update on Equalization, supra note
30, at 2, cols. 4-5.
125. See Rego Properties Corp. v. Finance Admin'r, 102 Misc. 2d at 644, 424 N.Y.S.2d at
624; CERTIORAR, supra note 33, at 43.
126. The 25 property groups include a number of groups which are either fully or par-
tially exempt from taxation. The city further divides each of these groups into a maximum
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classification system proves to be desirable, legal,12 fiscal, e12  and
political constraints' 9 must be kept in mind in devising such a
system.
of nine subgroups. The total number of subgroups of all properties within the city is 181. It
must be noted, however, that this does not mean that there are 181 separate and distinct
classes for the purpose of taxation. This information was furnished to the author by the
New York City Department of Finance.
127. See notes 119-24 supra and accompanying text. Two bills recently introduced in the
New York legislature, N.Y.S. No. 4130, N.Y.A. No. 6136 203d Sess. (1980) (Esposito-
Padavan), provide a clear example of the constitutional difficulties attempts at reform can
encounter. The legislation at base attempts to preserve and legalize the autonomy currently
enjoyed by local assessing units. Esposito-Padavan would replace § 306 of the Real Property
Tax Law as it presently exists with a new section which provides:
All real property in each assessing unit shall be assessed by any of the same meth-
ods of assessment as such real property was assessed for the assessment roll used
immediately prior to the year nineteen hundred seventy-five, provided, however, an-
other method of assessment may be adopted by a governing body of a municipal cor-
poration by resolution passed by a majority of the members of such body voting on
the resolution in accordance with the procedures in effect for the adoption of such
resolutions in such municipal corporation.
N.Y.S. No. 4130 § 1 203d Sess. (1980). Esposito-Padavan in all likelihood would be uncon-
stitutional for three reasons. First, assessing property "by any of the same methods" by
which it was assessed prior to 1975, is too vague to satisfy constitutional standards. In order
to comply with the standards of due process, a statute, especially a taxing statute must
inform the public as to how it will operate. See Chicago Union Traction Co. v. State Bd. of
Equal., 114 F. 557 (7th Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207
U.S. 20 (1907); Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. at 624-25. Second, the bills would also
effect an unconstitutional delegation of the legislature's taxing power. See N.Y. CONST. art.
XVI §§ 1, 2. See also notes 79-88 supra and accompanying text. Finally, the method of
assessment required by Esposito-Padavan would fail to comport with the requirements of
both state and federal equal protection clauses. The Esposito-Padavan bill does not provide
a rational basis for perpetuating the current practice of assessing similarly situated taxpay-
ers differently. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 493 F. Supp. 162, 169-71
(M.D. Tenn. 1978); Carey Transp., Inc. v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., 38 N.Y.2d
545, 552, 345 N.E.2d 281, 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 811, 814 (1975); Ampco Print-Advertisers' Off-
set Corp. v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 197 N.E.2d 285, 290, 247 N.Y.S.2d 865,
872-73, appeal dismissed for want of a sub. fed. question, 379 U.S. 5 (1964).
128. See notes 140-41 infra and accompanying text.
129. While this Article will avoid comment thereon, the political realities of the present
situation cannot be overlooked. The burden of full valuation will fall most heavily on those
who currently benefit the most from the present system; residential homeowners in Queens,
Brooklyn and Staten Island. See FuTuRE OF THE PROPERTY TAX, supra note 2, at 27 ("The
politics of property tax reform is only the most public part of the city's dilemma: The city
knows that no matter how it revises the system, it will place new burdens on some property
owners and remove old burdens from others. For this, it will receive little credit from the
once overburdened property owners who, by definition, have been overtaxed for decades.
And it will suffer virulent attack from the formerly underburdened Who will see no theoreti-
cal justice in the reformed system."). Id.
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B. Homestead Exemption & Circuit-Breakers
Another option available to the legislature is to enact a home-
stead exemption program,3 0 or a "circuit-breaker" tax systems'
either in tandem or separately.13' A homestead exemption in effect,
exempts "relatively inexpensive housing from taxation, lower[s] ef-
fective average tax rates for owner-occupants in somewhat expen-
sive housing, and increase[s] effective tax rates for all other prop-
erty owners."3 A circuit-breaker on the other hand, usually
provides either a credit against income taxes, with maximum
amounts determined by a sliding scale based on household gross
income.3 4 In this manner, a circuit-breaker program causes the
property tax to be more progressive with respect to income than a
homestead exemption' " because the tax relief under the circuit-
breaker is contingent on property taxes exceeding some percentage
130. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 40-9-19 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120 § 500.23-1, l(e)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.810 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-670 (Cum. Supp. 1980); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 467 (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981). See generally REPORT OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 98, at 64-65.
131. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 606 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§ 20501-20544 (West Supp. 1980) (applicable to renters); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,
§§ 6101-6111 (West 1978 & Supp. 1981) (limit on income eligibility and benefits). See gen-
erally Shannon, Federal Assistance in Modernizing State Sales and Local Property Taxes,
24 NAT'L TAX J. 379, 383-87 (1971). See also N.Y.S. No. 155 204th Sess. § I (prefiled Jan. 7,
1981).
132. Both the homestead exemption and the circuit-breaker systems have enjoyed the
support of the Temporary State Commission on the Real Property Tax, REPORT ON THE
REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 98, at 66, and the SBEA, PROPOSED REFORMS IN PROPERTY
TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, at 8-11, among others. See Future of the Property
Tax, supra note 2, at 18-21; COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE REAL ESTATE TAX SYSTEM, COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF
NEw YORK (1978). It should be noted that the Temporary Commission considered the
homestead exemption as being best suited to handle the tax shifts associated with revalua-
tion, while the circuit-breaker was felt to be better suited to handle the problems associated
with high individual tax burdens. See REPORT ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 98, at
65.
133. REPORT ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 98, at 64.
134. Id. at 63.
135. An essential element of any tax reform is a policy which favors progressive rather
than regressive tax adjustments, that is, granting relief to those least able to pay. PROPOSED
REFORMS IN PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 97, at 3. It has been argued that a
property tax because it is not tied to income or the ability to pay is regressive. This tradi-
tional view, however, has recently been questioned by studies as to the actual incidence of
the tax. See WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX, supra note 4, at 20-54.
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of the homeowner's income.' s
A homestead exemption or circuit-breaker program does not
suffer from the same legal difficulties which may be encountered in
the construction of a classification system.""7 However, both pro-
grams do reduce revenues.13 8 Further, under a homestead exemp-
tion program, unlike a classified tax system in which all properties
within a class pay at the same effective rate, the more valuable
properties pay taxes at effective rates much higher than the pre-
sent average. The degree of progressivity with respect to assessed
real estate values varies with the size of the exemption. In New
York City the exemption would have to be very large - about half
the average assessed values of houses - in order to prevent any
increase in taxes on homeowners as a group.139
VI. Conclusion
Continued delay in reforming the city's property tax system
could itself prove costly. The inequalities of the present system
have spawned appeals which now represent a potential liability to
New York City of over 1.7 billion dollars," 0 or almost half of the
yearly collections from the property tax; 1 further delay in resolv-
ing this dilemma will only exacerbate this problem. The uncertain-
ties over future taxes also discourage economic activity within the
city. With the shape of the city's tax system in doubt and with no
clear assessment standard, businesses and individuals contemplat-
136. See note 133-34 supra and accompanying text. A further distinction between a cir-
cuit-breaker and a homestead exemption should be noted. The cost of a circuit-breaker,
because it is a credit against state income taxes, is financed by the state. On the other hand,
the cost of a homestead exemption is placed on the municipality or county which levies the
property tax because the exemption decreases the actual amount of taxes which the home-
owner is required to pay.
137. See notes 65-88 supra and accompanying text.
138. The Temporary State Commission on the Real Property Tax observed that a $5,000
homestead exemption in New York would cost approximately $406 million annually in lost
revenues. REPORT ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 98, at 65. A circuit-breaker, while
not as costly as the homestead exemption would nevertheless reduce tax revenues for the
state. Id. at 63.
139. Estimate derived by author from data furnished by the New York City Department
of Finance. See note 3 supra.
140. See N.Y. STATE Div. OF EQUAL. AND ASSESSMENT, REVIEW OF NEW YORK CITY FISCAL
LIABILITY RESULTING FROM TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS 1, 4-5 (1979); Future of the
Property Tax, supra note 2, at 10-11.
141. Future of the Property Tax, supra note 2, at 11.
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ing buying property shy away from investing in New York City." 2
Furthermore, continued noncompliance with existing law could
force courts to impose immediate deadlines, causing too hasty a
revision of this complex and important tax." '
For reform to proceed, the state legislature must act decisively.
Past attempts to legalize the status quo have merely prolonged the
period of uncertainty. Once the legislature establishes a viable set
of programs, New York City and other municipalities in the state
can then get on with the difficult task of reforming their property
taxes with a minimum of disruption to taxpayers and the economy.
142. "Real property taxes, and the burden they impose upon New York residents, have
effectively encouraged the present population flight from New York State." Memorandum
in Support of N.Y.S. No. 155 204th Sess. (prefiled Jan. 7, 1981) (Sen. 0. Johnson). See-also
N.Y. STATE Div. oF EQUAL. AND ASSESSMENT (1980), BUSINESS PROPERTY TAXES AND EXEMP-
TIONS IN NEW YORK STATE: A SURvEY or BUSINESS LEADERS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFI-
CIALS 15-20.
143. An option currently being considered by the New York legislature to ease some of
the congestion caused by increasing tax certiorari appeals would establish a special real
property tax part of the state supreme court to hear and determine "proceedings to review
assessments of real property under Article 7 of the. real property tax law." N.Y.S. No. 8686,
§ 177-h 203d Seas. (Mar. 25, 1980). The special real property part, however, would entertain
only "minor controversies," where the contested assessment would result in an altered tax
liability in any one taxable year of $500 or less. N.Y.S. No. 8686, § 177-o. This provision will
not only speed the resolution of certiorari petitions which now flood the courts but the sim-
plified procedures envisioned in the bill, would also enable the average homeowner to ac-
tively pursue real property tax relief. See Memorandum in Support of S.8686, 203d Sess.
(Sen. Flynn). See also Hellerstein, The Appeals Machinery in Property Taxation, NAT'L
TAX Assoc. (1958). Given the possible increase in certiorari petitions under a classification
system, see notes 111-14 supra and accompanying text, mathematical revaluation, see notes
104-10 supra and accompanying text, or some hybrid thereof, a reform in the court system
discussed above is essential. It must be noted, however, that any, reforms in the certiorari
procedures must be preceded by a complete individual reassessment of all properties. If
such an assessment is not undertaken, then the increase in appeals spawned by the reforms,
given current assessment practices, will exceed the capacities of both the courts and the
city's fiscal resources.

